
PRESENTATION OF TENETS



by
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Presentation of Tenets

By Jetsün Manjushri Chökyi Gyaltzen

I pay homage to the eminent holy beings who are in essence inseparable from Guru Protector Manjushri.

Here, in explaining the presentation of tenets, there are three outlines:

1. definition,
2. divisions, and
3. the meaning of each division.

1 Definition

The definition of a person who propounds Buddhist tenets is: a person propounding tenets who accepts the Three Jewels to be the final objects of refuge and who does not assert any objects of refuge other than them.

2 Divisions

There are four divisions of proponents of Buddhist tenets:

1. The Proponents of the Great Exposition (*Sanskrit: Vaibhasika*),
2. The Proponents of Sutra (*Skt. Sautrantika*),
3. The Proponents of Mind Only (*Skt. Cittamatra*) and
4. The Proponents of the Middle Way (*Skt. Madhyamika*).

The first two are also called ‘the two schools that propound [truly existent external] objects’.

3 The meaning of each division

The explanation of the

1. Great Exposition School,
2. Sutra School,
3. Mind Only School and
4. Middle Way School.

Great Exposition School

The explanation of the Great Exposition School (*Skt. Vaibhasika*) has seven outlines:

1. definition,
2. divisions,
3. etymology,
4. way of asserting objects,
5. way of asserting object-possessors,
6. way of asserting selflessness and
7. presentation of the grounds and paths.

1 Definition

The definition of a Proponent of the Great Exposition is: a person propounding Lesser Vehicle (*Skt. Hinayana*) tenets who does not assert self-cognizers but does assert truly existent external objects.

2 Divisions

There are three divisions:¹

1. Proponents of the Great Exposition from Kashmir,
2. Proponents of the Great Exposition from the Western Region (*Skt. Aparantakas*) and
3. Proponents of the Great Exposition from the Central Region (*Skt. Magadhas*).

3 Etymology

Why are they called ‘Proponents of Particulars’?

They are called such because they propound tenets through following [Vasumitra’s] *Great Exposition of Particulars* (*Skt. Mahavibhasa*) or, alternatively, they are called Proponents of Particulars because they propound the three times to be particulars [i.e., instances] of substances.

4 Way of asserting objects

The definition of thing is: that which is able to perform a function.

Thing, existent, and object of knowledge are equivalent.

There are two types of things:

1. permanent things and
2. impermanent things.

Examples of permanent things are uncompounded space, analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations.

¹ There is also a division into 18 sub-schools: Majority Community, One Convention, Proponents of World-Transcendence, Much Hearing, Proponents of Imputation, Monument Ones, Eastern Mountain Ones, Western Mountain Ones, Abiding Firmly, Proponents of the Existence of All, Vatsiputra Followers, Dharmottara Followers, Bhadraryana Followers, Mahasammata Followers, Great Teaching, Dharmagupta Followers, Kashyapa Followers and Uttara Followers. [*Maps of the Profound* (Hopkins) pages 210-217]

Examples of impermanent things are created phenomena, products, and impermanent phenomena.

Another way of dividing things is into:

1. conventional truths and
2. ultimate truths.

The definition of a conventional truth is: a phenomenon such that an awareness apprehending it is cancelled if it is broken up or mentally separated into its individual parts.

Illustrations [of conventional truths] are, for example, a vase and a woollen cloth because if a vase is broken with a hammer, the mind apprehending it is cancelled, and if a woollen cloth is separated into its individual threads, the mind apprehending it is cancelled.

The definition of an ultimate truth is: A phenomenon such that an awareness apprehending it is not cancelled if it is broken up or mentally separated into its individual parts.

Illustrations [of ultimate truths] are, for example, directionally partless particles, temporally partless [moments of] consciousness, and uncompounded phenomena.

The *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge* (Skt. *Abhidharmakosa*) says: “Those things – such as a pot or water – that the mind cannot engage if they are broken or mentally separated into other [things] exist as conventional [truths]. Others exist as ultimate [truths].”

The three times are asserted to be substances. A pot is asserted to exist also at the time of the past of the pot and at the time of the future of the pot.

5 Way of asserting object-possessors

There are various assertions:

- [most of the eighteen sub-schools] assert the mere collection of the five aggregates to be the illustration of the person,
- [the Proponents of the Great Exposition from the Western Region] assert the mental consciousness to be the illustration of the person,
- and so forth [e.g., the Kashmiris assert the continuum of the aggregates to be the illustration of the person].

There are two types of awarenesses:

1. valid cognizers and
2. non-valid cognizers.²

There are two types of valid cognizers:

1. direct valid cognizers and
2. inferential valid cognizers.

There are three types of direct valid cognizers:

1. sense direct perceivers,
2. mental direct perceivers, and
3. yogic direct perceivers.³

² JN: The word ‘cognition’ (*tshad ma*) has been changed throughout the text to ‘cognizer.’

³ JN: The word ‘perception’ (*mngon sum*) has been changed throughout the text to ‘direct perceiver.’

A sense direct valid cognizer is not necessarily a consciousness because an eye sense power is a direct valid cognizer.

There are two types of yogic direct perceivers:

1. yogic direct perceivers that directly realize the selflessness of persons and
2. yogic direct perceivers that directly realize subtle impermanence.

There are two types of yogic direct perceivers that directly realize the selflessness of persons:

1. yogic direct perceivers that realize the person to be empty of being permanent, unitary, and independent and
2. yogic direct perceivers that realize the person to be empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent.

6 Way of asserting selflessness

Subtle selflessness and subtle selflessness of persons are asserted to be equivalent.

A selflessness of phenomena is not accepted because it is accepted that if it is an established base it is necessarily a self of phenomena.

Among them, the Followers of Vatsiputra, [one of the eighteen sub-schools,] accept a selflessness of person that is [a person] being empty of being permanent, unitary, and independent. However, they do not accept a selflessness of person that is [a person] being empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent because they accept a self-sufficient substantially existent self that is inexpressible even in terms of being one entity with or a different entity from the aggregates, and being permanent or impermanent.

7 Presentation of the grounds and paths

This is explained in two parts:

1. objects of abandonment and
2. actual presentation of the grounds and paths.

7A Objects of abandonment

Two types of obscurations are asserted:

1. afflictive obscurations and
2. non-afflictive obscurations.

There is no such thing as the convention ‘obscurations to knowledge.’⁴

Afflictive obscurations mainly prevent the attainment of liberation and non-afflictive obscurations mainly prevent the attainment of all-knowingness.⁵

Illustrations of afflictive obscurations are, for example, the conception apprehending the person to be self-sufficient substantially existent and the three poisons that arise due to the force of that [conception] together with their seeds.

⁴ JN: The term ‘cognitive obscuration’ (*shes sgrib*) has been changed throughout the text to the more familiar ‘obscurations to knowledge’.

⁵ JN: *thams chad mkhyen pa*, omniscience.

[Illustrations of] non-afflictive obscurations are, for example, the latencies (*bag chags*) of the conception apprehending the person to be self-sufficient substantially existent and the negative tendencies of the mind that arise due to the force of those [latencies].

7B Actual presentation of the grounds and paths

It is asserted that there are differences in the way in which the persons of the three vehicles traverse the path.

Those of the hearer lineage conjoin the view realizing the person to be empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent with a small collection of merit and, having cultivated that for at least three lifetimes, attain the small enlightenment.

Those of the solitary realizer lineage conjoin the view realizing the person to be empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent with a middling collection of merit and, having cultivated that for at least one hundred eons, attain the middling enlightenment.

Bodhisattvas conjoin the view realizing the person to be empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent with a great collection of merit and, having cultivated that for at least three countless great eons, attain the great enlightenment.

There are differences in the way in which they accumulate merit.

Bodhisattvas, having accumulated merit for at least three countless great eons on the great stage of the path of accumulation and below, actualize the heat stage of the path of preparation through to the path of no-more-learning on one seat.

Those of the solitary realizer lineage, having accumulated merit for at least one hundred great eons on the great stage of the path of accumulation and below, actualize the heat stage of the path of preparation through to the path of no-more-learning on one seat.

Those of the hearer lineage accumulate merit on all four learning paths and, even after having attained a superior's path, must also train on the learning paths for up to fourteen lifetimes.

They assert that a buddha's form aggregate is not a buddha because it is an object to be abandoned. This is so because it is included in the same lifetime as the bodily support of the earlier bodhisattva on the path of preparation. This is necessarily so because the bodily support of the bodhisattva on the path of preparation is an aggregate projected by previous karma and afflictions.

A complete enjoyment body (*Skt. sambhogakaya*) is not accepted, and it is asserted that, at the time of a nirvana without remainder of a supreme emanation body, the continuum of awareness is severed.

Although a buddha superior has abandoned all sufferings and their origins without exception, it is not contradictory that he still has true sufferings in his continuum. This is because abandoning every single affliction that observes true sufferings is posited as abandoning true sufferings.

From the point of attaining the state of foe destroyer until they give up their compositional factor of life [i.e., until they die], hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers are posited as being with remainder, whereas from the point of giving up their compositional factor of life [i.e.,

having died] they are posited as having passed beyond sorrow without remainder [i.e., having attained a nirvana without remainder].

Although at the time of a nirvana with remainder they have abandoned the afflictive obscurations without exception, they have not abandoned the non-afflictive obscurations. Although at the time of a nirvana without remainder the non-afflictive obscurations are not destroyed by the power of an antidote, they do not exist because at that time, their support – the continuum of awareness – is severed.

When the proponents of things, [i.e., the Great Exposition, Sutra, and Mind Only schools,] differentiate definitive and interpretive sutras, they differentiate them by means of whether or not they are suitable to be accepted literally.

[Some⁶ among] the two schools that propound objects, [i.e., the Great Exposition and Sutra schools,] do not assert the Great Vehicle (*Skt. Mahayana*) scriptural collection to be the Buddha's word because most Proponents of the Great Exposition accept that the sutras are necessarily sutras of definitive meaning.

⁶ Jamyang Shayba's *Great Exposition of Tenets* says: 'Even most Proponents of Sutra Following Scripture and Proponents of Sutra Following Reasoning assert that the Great Vehicle scriptural collections are the word of the Buddha requiring interpretation.'

Sutra School

The explanation of the Sutra School (*Skt. Sautrantika*) has seven outlines:

- definition,
3. divisions,
4. etymology,
5. way of asserting objects,
6. way of asserting object-possessors,
7. way of asserting selflessness, and
8. presentation of the grounds and paths.

1 Definition

The definition of a Proponent of Sutra is: a person propounding Lesser Vehicle tenets who accepts both self-cognizers and external objects.

Proponent of Sutra (*Skt. Sautrantika*) and Exemplifier (*Skt. Darstantika*) are equivalent.

2 Divisions

There are two divisions:

1. Followers of Scripture and
2. Followers of Reasoning.

An example of a Follower of Scripture is a Proponent of Sutra who follows [Vasubandhu's] *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge*.

An example of a Follower of Reasoning is a Proponent of Sutra who follows [Dharmakirti's] *Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition*.

3 Etymology

Why are they called 'Proponents of Sutra'?

They are called Proponents of Sutra due to propounding tenets through following the sutras of the Bhagavan, and they are called Exemplifiers due to desiring to teach all phenomena by way of examples.

4 Way of asserting objects

The definition of existent is: that observed by a valid cognizer.

There are two types of existents:

1. conventional truths and
2. ultimate truths.

The definition of an ultimate truth⁷ is: a phenomenon that is ultimately able to perform a function.

⁷ This is according to the Followers of Reasoning. The Followers of Scripture assert the two truths in the same way as the Proponents of the Great Exposition.

Ultimate truth, truly existent, thing, product, impermanent phenomenon, compounded phenomenon, substance, and specifically characterized phenomenon are equivalent.

The definition of a conventional truth is: a phenomenon that is not ultimately able to perform a function.

Conventional truth, falsely existent, permanent phenomenon, and generally characterized phenomenon are equivalent.

Another way of dividing existents is into:

1. negative phenomena and
2. positive phenomena.

The definition of a negative phenomenon is: an object realized by the awareness apprehending it by way of eliminating its object of negation.

The definition of a positive phenomenon is: an object realized by the awareness apprehending it by way of not eliminating its object of negation.

There are two types of negatives:

1. non-affirming negatives and
2. affirming negatives.

Illustrations of non-affirming negatives are, for example, uncompounded space, true cessations, and emptinesses.

Illustrations of affirming negatives are, for example, the opposite of non-thing and the appearance of the opposite of non-pot to a conception apprehending pot.

Another way of dividing existents is into:

1. single phenomena and
2. different phenomena.

There are two types of single phenomena:

1. false singles and
2. true singles.

Examples of a false single is object of knowledge and generally characterized phenomenon.

Examples of a true single is thing and impermanent phenomenon.

There are two types of different phenomena:

1. false different and
2. true different.

An example of a false different is the pair – isolate of pot and isolate of pillar.

An example of a true different is the pair – pot and pillar.

Past and future are both permanent. Present and thing are equivalent.

5 Way of asserting object-possessors

There are two assertions among the Proponents of Sutra:

1. some assert the continuum of the aggregates to be the illustration of the person and

2. some assert the mental consciousness to be the illustration of the person.

An example of the first is Proponents of Sutra who follow the *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge*.

An example of the second is Proponents of Sutra who follow the Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition.

The definition of awareness is: that which is clear and cognizing.

There are two types of awarenesses:

1. valid cognizers and
2. non-valid cognizers.

The definition of a valid cognizer is: a new and incontrovertible cognizer.⁸

In outlining the definition of valid cognizer it is necessary to mention the three - 'new,' 'incontrovertible,' and 'cognizer' - because 'new' eliminates subsequent cognizers being valid cognizers, 'incontrovertible' eliminates correct assumptions being valid cognizers, and 'cognizer' eliminates physical sense powers being valid cognizers.

There are two types of valid cognizers:

1. direct valid cognizers and
2. inferential valid cognizers.

The definition of a direct perceiver is: a non-mistaken cognizer that is free from conceptuality.

The definition of a direct valid cognizer is: a new and incontrovertible cognizer that is free from conceptuality.

There are four types of direct valid cognizers:

1. self-cognizing direct valid cognizers,
2. sense direct valid cognizers,
3. mental direct valid cognizers, and
4. yogic direct valid cognizers.

The definition of a self-cognizing direct valid cognizer is: a new and incontrovertible cognizer that is free from conceptuality, is only inwardly directed, and is just an apprehender.⁹

The definition of a sense direct valid cognizer is: a new and incontrovertible cognizer that is free from conceptuality and arises in dependence upon a physical sense power - its own uncommon empowering condition.

The definition of a mental direct valid cognizer is: a new and incontrovertible cognizer that is free from conceptuality and arises in dependence upon a mental sense power - its own uncommon empowering condition.

The definition of a yogic direct valid cognizer is: an exalted wisdom that directly realizes subtle impermanence or either the coarse or subtle selflessness of persons in dependence

⁸ JN: The terms 'deceptive' (*slu ba*) and 'non-deceptive' (*mi slu ba*) have been changed throughout the text to 'controvertible' and 'incontrovertible.'

⁹ JN: 'bears the aspect of an apprehending-subject.' has been changed to 'just an apprehender.' (*'dzin pa yan gar bar gyur pa*).

upon a meditative stabilization that is a union of calm abiding and special insight – its own uncommon empowering condition.

There are three types of yogic direct valid cognizers:

1. valid cognizers that directly realize subtle impermanence,
2. valid cognizers that directly realize the coarse selflessness of persons, and
3. valid cognizers that directly realize the subtle selflessness of persons.

The definition of an inferential valid cognizer is: a new and incontrovertible determinative cognizer that is generated in dependence upon a correct reason – its basis.

There are three types of inferential valid cognizers:

1. inferential cognizers through the power of the fact,
2. inferential cognizers through renown, and
3. inferential cognizers through belief.

An illustration of an inferential cognizer through the power of the fact is an inferential cognizer that realizes sound to be impermanent due to the reason that it is a product.

An illustration of an inferential cognizer through renown is an inferential cognizer that realizes that ‘rabbit-bearer’ is suitable to be called by the term ‘moon’ through the reason that it exists among objects of conception.

An illustration of an inferential cognizer through belief is, for example, an inferential cognizer that realizes the scripture ‘Due to generosity [comes] wealth; due to ethics [comes] happiness’ and so on is incontrovertible with respect to the meaning indicated by it through the reason that it is a completely reliable scripture by the three-fold analysis.

An inferential cognizer through renown is necessarily an inferential cognizer through the power of the fact.

If it is a direct perceiver it is not necessarily a direct valid cognizer. If it is an inferential cognizer it is not necessarily an inferential valid cognizer because the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending form and the second moment of an inferential cognizer realizing sound to be impermanent are subsequent cognizers. This is so because Dharmottara’s Commentary to (Dharmakirti’s) *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* says: “The two – the first moment of a direct perceiver and the first moment of an inferential cognizer – are valid cognizers. Later moments [of those cognizers], since they are not different in terms of establishment and abiding – being a continuation of those, are not valid cognizers.”

The definition of a non-valid cognizer is: a cognizer that is not new and incontrovertible.

There are five types of non-valid cognizers:

1. subsequent cognizers,
2. wrong consciousnesses,
3. doubt,
4. correct assumptions, and
5. inattentive awarenesses.

The definition of a subsequent cognizer is: a cognizer that realizes that which has already been realized.

There are two types of subsequent cognizers:

1. conceptual subsequent cognizers and
2. non-conceptual subsequent cognizers.

Examples of conceptual subsequent cognizers are a remembering consciousness remembering blue that is generated through being induced by a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue and the second moment of an inferential cognizer realizing sound to be impermanent.

An example of a non-conceptual subsequent cognizer is the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form.

The definition of a wrong consciousness is: a cognizer that engages [its object] mistakenly.

There are two types of wrong consciousnesses:

1. conceptual wrong consciousnesses and
2. non-conceptual wrong consciousnesses.

An example of a conceptual wrong consciousness is a conception apprehending sound to be permanent.

Examples of non-conceptual wrong consciousnesses are a sense consciousness to which one moon appears as two moons and a sense consciousness to which a snow mountain appears as blue.

The definition of doubt is: a mental factor that, by its own force, hesitates with respect to two alternatives.

A mental consciousness that is concomitant with [doubt] and the accompanying feelings are not that which by their own force hesitate with respect to two alternatives because they hesitate with respect to two alternatives due to the force of that doubt.

There are three types of doubt:

1. doubt tending towards the fact,
2. doubt tending away from the fact, and
3. equal doubt.

An example of a doubt tending towards the fact is a doubt that thinks “Sound is probably impermanent.”

An example of a doubt tending away from the fact is a doubt that thinks “Sound is probably permanent.”

An example of an equal doubt is a doubt that thinks “Sound could be either permanent or impermanent.”

The definition of a correct assumption is: a determinative cognizer that accords with the fact but is controvertible in determining its object.¹⁰

There are five types of correct assumptions:

1. correct assumptions without a reason,

¹⁰ JN: ‘deceptively determines its object’ has been changed to ‘is controvertible in determining its object’ (*rang yul la zhen pas slu ba*)

2. correct assumptions with a contradictory reason,
3. correct assumptions with an indefinite reason,
4. correct assumptions with an inapplicable reason, and
5. correct assumptions with a correct but undetermined reason.

An awareness apprehending sound to be impermanent in dependence on the mere words “Sound is impermanent” is, for example, an illustration of a correct assumption without a reason because although the words “Sound is impermanent” express the thesis that sound is impermanent, a correct reason why sound is impermanent has not been stated.

An awareness apprehending sound to be impermanent due to the reason of its being empty of the ability to perform a function is, for example, an illustration of a correct assumption with a contradictory reason because being empty of the ability to perform a function is contradictory with sound.

An awareness apprehending sound to be impermanent due to the reason of its being an object of comprehension is, for example, an illustration of a correct assumption with an indefinite reason because being an object of comprehension is an indefinite reason for establishing sound to be impermanent.

An awareness apprehending sound to be impermanent due to the reason of its being an object of apprehension of an eye consciousness is, for example, an illustration of a correct assumption with an inapplicable reason because being an object of apprehension of an eye consciousness is an inapplicable reason for proving that sound is impermanent.

An awareness apprehending sound to be impermanent due to the reason of its being a product in the continuum of a person who has not ascertained by a valid cognizer that sound is impermanent is, for example, an illustration of a correct assumption with a correct but undetermined reason because, although being a product is a correct reason to establish that sound is impermanent, that correct reason has not been determined by that person.

The definition of an inattentive awareness is: a non-mistaken cognizer that has a clear appearance of its object but does not ascertain it.

There are three types of inattentive awarenesses:

1. inattentive sense direct perceivers,
2. inattentive mental direct perceivers, and
3. inattentive self-cognizing direct perceivers.

An example of inattentive sense direct perceiver is an ear consciousness apprehending sound at the time the eyes are engrossed in a beautiful form.

Examples of an inattentive mental direct perceiver are mental direct perceivers in the continuum of an ordinary being that apprehend the five objects - forms and so forth.

Examples of an inattentive self-cognizing direct perceivers are self-cognizers in the continuum of an ordinary being that experience mental direct perceivers apprehending the five objects - forms and so forth.

In general, there are three types of object-possessors:

1. beings,

2. speech, and
3. valid cognizers.

There are three types of valid object-possessors:

1. valid persons,
2. valid speech, and
3. valid consciousnesses.

An example of a valid person is said to be the Teacher – [Shakyamuni] Buddha.

An example of valid speech is said to be the turning of the wheel of Dharma of the four truths.

Examples of valid consciousnesses are direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers.

6 Way of asserting selflessness

The person being empty of being permanent, unitary, and independent is asserted to be a coarse selflessness of persons and the person being empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent is asserted to be the subtle selflessness of persons.

They are similar to the Proponents of the Great Exposition in not accepting a selflessness of phenomena.

7 Presentation of the grounds and paths

Since for those of all three lineages the accumulation of merit is accumulated on all four learning paths, a buddha's form aggregate is accepted to be a buddha.

The presentation of the obscurations and the way of traversing the grounds and paths and so forth are similar to [the assertions of] the Proponents of the Great Exposition.

Mind Only School

The explanation of the Mind Only School (*Skt. Cittamatra*) has seven outlines, as before.

1 Definition

The definition of a Proponent of Mind Only is: a person propounding Great Vehicle tenets who does not accept external objects but does assert truly existent self-cognizers.

Proponent of Mind Only (*Skt. Cittamatrin*), Proponent of Cognition (*Skt. Vijnaptivadin*), and Yogic Practitioner (*Skt. Yogacarin*) are equivalent.

2 Divisions

There are two divisions:¹¹

1. Mind Only True Aspectarians (*Skt. Satyakaravadin*) and
2. Mind Only False Aspectarians (*Skt. Alikakaravadin*).

The definition of a Mind Only True Aspectarian is: a Proponent of Mind Only who asserts that a direct perceiver apprehending form in the continuum of an ordinary being does not engage, polluted by the latencies of ignorance, in the factor of its appearance as a gross form.

The definition of a Mind Only False Aspectarian is: a Proponent of Mind Only who asserts that a direct perceiver apprehending form in the continuum of an ordinary being does engage, polluted by the latencies of ignorance, in the factor of its appearance as a gross form.

There are three types of True Aspectarians:

1. Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehendeds and Apprehenders,¹²
2. Half-Eggists, and
3. Non-Pluralists.

Each has their own individual assertions.

It is said that the Proponents of an Equal Number of Apprehendeds and Apprehenders assert that when an eye consciousness apprehending the mottled colors on the wing of a butterfly apprehends the mottle, from the object's side the aspect of each different color – blue, yellow, and so on – is delivered, and also from the subject's side the aspect of each different color – blue, yellow, and so on – is produced in its true aspect.

It is said that the Half-Eggists assert that when such is apprehended, from the object's side the aspect of each different color – blue, yellow, and so on – is delivered, however from the subject's side the aspect of each different color – blue, yellow, and so on – is produced in an aspectless manner.

It is said that the Non-Pluralists assert that when such is apprehended, from the object's side the aspect of each different color – blue, yellow, and so on – is not delivered, but rather the

¹¹ Alternatively they can be divided into Followers of Scripture (followers of Asanga's Treatises on the Grounds) and Followers of Reasoning (followers of Dharmakirti's Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition).

¹² JN: 'Apprehended-objects' and 'apprehending-subjects' have been respectively changed throughout the text to 'apprehendeds' and 'apprehenders' (*gzung 'dzin*).

aspect of the mere conglomeration is delivered; and from the subject's side the aspect of each different color – blue, yellow, and so on – is not produced in an aspectless manner, but rather the aspect of the mere conglomeration is produced in an aspectless manner.

There are two types of False Aspectarians:

1. Tainted False Aspectarians and
2. Untainted False Aspectarians.

3 Etymology

Why are they called 'Proponents of Mind Only'?

They are called Proponents of Mind Only because they assert that phenomena are merely the nature of mind, and they are called Proponents of Cognition because they assert that all phenomena are merely the nature of cognition.

4 Way of asserting objects

There are two types of objects of knowledge:

1. ultimate truths and
2. conventional truths.

The definition of an ultimate truth is: that which is realized by the direct valid cognizer directly realizing it by way of the vanishing of dualistic appearance.

Ultimate truth, final reality (Skt. *dharmata*), sphere of reality (Skt. *dharmadhatu*), and final mode of abiding are equivalent.

There are two divisions of ultimate truths:

1. subtle selflessness of phenomena and
2. subtle selflessness of persons.

When the subtle selflessness of phenomena is divided by way of the bases of emptiness, there are twenty emptinesses. When they are condensed, there are eighteen; when they are condensed, there are sixteen; when they are condensed, there are four emptinesses, and so forth.

Illustrations of the subtle selflessness of phenomena are, for example, the emptiness that is a form and the valid cognizer apprehending that form being empty of being different substances and the emptiness that is a form being empty of existing by way of its own characteristics as a basis for applying the term 'form.'

An illustration of the subtle selflessness of persons is, for example, the emptiness that is a person being empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent.

The definition of a conventional truth is: that which is realized by the direct valid cognizer directly realizing it by way of being together with dualistic appearance.

There are two types of conventional truths:

1. other-powered phenomena and
2. conventional truths that are included in imputational constructs.

Other-powered phenomena and compounded phenomena are equivalent.

Conventional truths that are included in imputational constructs and uncompounded phenomena other than ultimate truths are equivalent.

All things are accepted to be the common locus of being truly existent and being a falsity; all final realities are accepted to be the common locus of being truly existent and being true; and all uncompounded phenomena other than final realities are accepted to be the common locus of being falsely existent and being a falsity.

Final realities are necessarily non-affirming negatives. Illustrations of other non-affirming negatives are similar to those of the Proponents of Sutra.

The five sense objects – forms and so forth – are produced on the basis of a substance that is an inner consciousness in dependence upon the latencies of common and uncommon actions deposited upon the mind-basis-of-all. They are not established as external objects.

According to the True Aspectarians, even though the five sense objects – forms and so forth – are not external objects they are accepted to exist as gross objects.

According to the False Aspectarians, the five sense objects – forms and so forth – are not gross objects because if they were gross objects they would necessarily be external objects.

5 Way of asserting object-possessors

True Aspectarians accept a collection of eight consciousnesses because they assert that in addition to the collection of six consciousnesses accepted by the other proponents of tenets, there are the mind-basis-of-all and the afflicted mentality, making a total of a collection of eight consciousnesses.¹³ There are illustrations of both a mind-basis-of-all and an afflicted mentality. The consciousness that is an object different from the collection of six consciousnesses and that does not depend upon a sense power which is its own empowering condition is asserted to be the mind-basis-of-all. The consciousness that observes the mind-basis-of-all – its observed object – and apprehends it in the aspect of it being a self-sufficient substantially existent I is asserted to be the afflicted mentality. The mind-basis-of-all is asserted to be the illustration of the person that is the support of actions (*Skt. karma*) and their results.

False Aspectarians assert a collection of six consciousnesses and posit the mere mental consciousness to be the illustration of the person that is the support of actions and their results.

[The Proponents of Mind Only] assert two types of awarenesses:

1. valid cognizers and
2. non-valid cognizers.

They assert two types of valid cognizers:

1. direct valid cognizers and
2. inferential valid cognizers.

¹³ JN: 'Eight collections of consciousness' and 'six collections of consciousness' have been respectively changed to 'collection of eight consciousnesses' and 'collection of six consciousnesses' (*mam shes tshogs brgyad* and *mam shes tshogs drug*).

There are four types of direct perceivers. Self-cognizing direct perceivers and yogic direct perceivers are necessarily non-mistaken consciousnesses. A sense direct perceiver in the continuum of an ordinary being is necessarily a mistaken consciousness. A mental direct perceiver in the continuum of an ordinary being can be either a mistaken consciousness or a non-mistaken consciousness.

A direct perceiver is not necessarily a direct valid cognizer because, although there exists a mental direct perceiver apprehending form in the continuum of an ordinary being, there does not exist a mental direct valid cognizer apprehending form in the continuum of an ordinary being.

A self-cognizer experiencing a mental direct perceiver apprehending form in the continuum of an ordinary being and the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending form are non-valid cognizers.

There are four types of yogic direct perceivers:

1. yogic direct perceivers that directly realize subtle impermanence,
2. yogic direct perceivers that directly realize the subtle selflessness of persons,
3. yogic direct perceivers that directly realize the coarse selflessness of persons, and
4. yogic direct perceivers that directly realize the selflessness of phenomena.

An inferential valid cognizer is necessarily conceptual. If it is an inferential cognizer with respect to a phenomenon, it is not necessarily a conception with respect to that phenomenon because, although the inferential cognizer realizing sound to be impermanent is an inferential cognizer with respect to sound being empty of being permanent, it is not a conception with respect to that. This is so because if it is a conception with respect to a phenomenon, the aspect of that phenomenon necessarily arises and with respect to the inferential cognizer realizing sound to be impermanent, the aspect of the sound being empty of being permanent does not arise. Therefore, that [inferential cognizer] does not explicitly realize [sound to be empty of being permanent]; it realizes that implicitly when it explicitly realizes sound to be impermanent.

6 Way of asserting selflessness

The way of positing illustrations of the coarse and subtle selflessness of persons is similar to the Autonomists and below.

An illustration of the selflessness of phenomena is, for example, the emptiness that is a form and the valid cognizer apprehending that form being empty of being different substances.

7 Presentation of the grounds and paths

This is explained in two parts:

1. objects of abandonment and
2. actual presentation of the grounds and paths.

7A Objects of abandonment

The conception of a self of persons together with its seeds and the three poisons arising due to the force of that [conception] together with their seeds are posited to be afflictive obscurations.

The conception of [things] as being true¹⁴ together with its seeds, the latencies of that [conception], and all mistaken dualistic appearances that arise due to the force of that are posited to be obscurations to knowledge.

7B Actual presentation of the grounds and paths

Those of the hearer lineage conjoin the view realizing the selflessness of persons with a small accumulation of merit for the sake of their own welfare, while those of the solitary realizer lineage conjoin the view realizing the selflessness of persons with a middling accumulation of merit for the sake of their own welfare, and, in dependence on having cultivated that for at least three lifetimes, one hundred eons, and so on, actualize their respective enlightenments.

Bodhisattvas conjoin the view realizing apprehenders and apprehendeds being empty of being different substances with a great accumulation of merit for the sake of others' welfare, and, in dependence on having cultivated that for at least three countless great eons and so on, actualize their respective enlightenment.

True Aspectarians assert that when hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers pass beyond sorrow without remainder their continuum of awareness is severed. They assert that it is impossible to sever the continuum of awareness of a buddha superior because they assert that for the bodhisattva who attained enlightenment initially as a complete enjoyment body in Akanishta, the continuum of similar type of aspect of that complete enjoyment body is not severed as long as samsara is not empty, but rather it enacts the welfare of others through various emanations in accordance with the fortunes of each individual disciple. The individual lineages of the three vehicles are definite because they assert that sentient beings, since beginningless time, are of three different lineages or dispositions and thus have three different aspirations, and thus have three different ways of practicing, and thus will attain three different results.

False Aspectarians do not assert that when hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers pass beyond sorrow without remainder their continuum of awareness is severed because, although they assert that, at that time, the continuum of mere awareness that is included in true sufferings and true origins is severed, they assert that mere awareness goes on to the buddha ground. Therefore, they assert one final vehicle.

¹⁴ Things being true means things existing in the way that they appear in terms of appearing to be external to the consciousness apprehending them and in terms of appearing to exist by way of their own characteristics as a basis for applying terms.

Middle Way School

The explanation of the system of the Proponents of Non-Nature (*Skt. Nihsvabhavavadin*)¹⁵ has three outlines:

1. definition,
2. divisions, and
3. meaning of each division.

1 Definition

The definition of a Proponent of Non-Nature (*Skt. Nihsvabhavavadin*) is: a person propounding Great Vehicle tenets who does not assert true existence even conventionally.

2 Divisions

There are two divisions:

1. Autonomists (*Skt. Svatantrika*) and
2. Consequentialists (*Skt. Prasangika*).

3 Meaning of each division

The explanation of the Autonomy School and the Consequence School.

¹⁵ JN: Changed from 'Middle Way School (*Skt. Madhyamika*).'

Autonomy School

The explanation of the Autonomy School (*Skt. Svatantrika*) has seven outlines:

1. definition,
2. divisions,
3. etymology,
4. way of asserting objects,
5. way of asserting object-possessors,
6. way of asserting selflessness, and
7. presentation of the grounds and paths.

1 Definition

The definition of an Autonomist is: a Proponent of the Middle Way who, by way of accepting autonomous reasons, does not assert true existence even conventionally.

Autonomist (*Skt. Svatantrika*) and Proponent of the Middle Way who Propounds Inherent Existence are equivalent.

2 Divisions

There are two divisions:

1. Sutra Middle Way Autonomists (*Skt. Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika*) and
2. Yogic Middle Way Autonomists (*Skt. Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika*).

The definition of a Sutra Middle Way Autonomist is: a Proponent of the Middle Way who propounds a presentation of conventionalities through mostly conforming with the Proponents of Sutra.

The definition of a Yogic Middle Way Autonomist is: a Proponent of the Middle Way who propounds a presentation of conventionalities through mostly conforming with the Proponents of Mind Only.

Illustrations of Sutra Middle Way Autonomists are, for example, Bhavaviveka and Jnanagarbha.

Illustrations of Yogic Middle Way Autonomists are, for example, Shantarakshita, Haribhadra, and Kamalashila.

3 Etymology

There is a reason why Bhavaviveka is called a 'Middle Way Autonomist'. He is called such due to the reason of him being a Proponent of the Middle Way who accepts autonomous reasons.

4 Way of asserting objects

Existence by way of its own characteristics, existence from its own side, and inherent existence are equivalent.

Uncompounded space, true cessations, the past and future, and the subtle selflessness of persons are both non-affirming negatives and conventional truths.

Ultimate truth, final reality, and the subtle selflessness of phenomena are equivalent.

Sutra Middle Way Autonomists assert that the five sense objects – forms and so forth – are different entities from consciousness and that they are gross external objects composed of partless¹⁶ particles.

Yogic Middle Way Autonomists assert that the five sense objects – forms and so forth – are one entity with the consciousness apprehending them.

5 Way of asserting object-possessors

The mental consciousness is asserted to be the illustration of the person.

They assert a collection of six consciousnesses.

There are two types of awarenesses:

1. valid cognizers and
2. non-valid cognizers.

There are two types of valid cognizers:

1. direct valid cognizers and
2. inferential valid cognizers.

Sutra Middle Way Autonomists do not assert self-cognizing direct perceivers.

Yogic Middle Way Autonomists assert all four types of direct perceivers. Self-cognizing direct perceivers and yogic direct perceivers are necessarily non-mistaken consciousnesses, while the other two, [sense direct perceivers and mental direct perceivers,] can be either mistaken or non-mistaken.

Proponents of Sutra, Proponents of Mind Only, and Autonomists all accept that:

- a direct perceiver is necessarily a consciousness free from conceptuality,
- a subsequent cognizer is necessarily a non-valid cognizer,
- a consciousness that is mistaken with respect to its determined object is necessarily a wrong consciousness,
- if it is a mistaken consciousness with respect to a phenomenon, it is necessarily not a valid cognizer with respect to that phenomenon,
- if it is an inferential cognizer, it is necessarily not a valid cognizer with respect to its appearing object, and so on.

6 Way of asserting selflessness

The person being empty of being permanent, unitary, and independent is asserted to be a coarse selflessness of persons, while the person being empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent is a subtle selflessness of persons.

Yogic Middle Way Autonomists assert that a form and the cognizer apprehending that form being empty of being different substances is a coarse selflessness of phenomena.

¹⁶ This needs to be investigated since Jamyang Shayba in his *Great Exposition of Tenets* says ‘Because of being refuted by many, it is mistaken that Proponents of the Middle Way and of Mind Only assert partless particles.’

All phenomena being empty of true existence is asserted to be the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

The two [subtle] selflessnesses are differentiated by way of the object of negation and not by way of the basis of the emptiness because the refutation of the object of negation - true existence - upon the basis of a person is the subtle selflessness of phenomena, while the refutation of self-sufficient substantial existence upon the basis of a person is the subtle selflessness of persons.

The two conceptions of self are differentiated by way of the mode of apprehension and not by way of the observed object because through observing the basis - the person - and apprehending it to be truly existent it is a conception of a self of phenomena, and through observing the basis - the person - and apprehending it to be self-sufficient substantially existent it is a conception of a self of persons.

7 Presentation of the grounds and paths

According to Yogic Middle Way Autonomists the differences between the persons of the three vehicles are posited in terms of three different obscurations that are the main objects of abandonment and three different views that are the main objects of meditation.

Those of the hearer lineage, having taken the conception apprehending [the person] to be self-sufficient substantially existent together with its retinue as their main object of abandonment, through taking, as the antidote to that, the view realizing the person to be empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent as their main object of meditation, attain the small enlightenment.

Those of the solitary realizer lineage, having taken the conception apprehending a form and the valid cognizer apprehending that form to be different substances as their main object of abandonment, through taking, as the antidote to that, the view realizing apprehenders and apprehendeds to be empty of being different substances as their main object of meditation, attain the middling enlightenment.

Bodhisattvas, having taken the conception of true existence together with its latencies as their main object of abandonment, through taking, as the antidote to that, the view realizing all phenomena to be lacking true existence as their main object of meditation, attain the great enlightenment.

According to Sutra Middle Way Autonomists there is no difference between hearers and solitary realizers regarding their main objects of abandonment and main objects of meditation because they are similar in taking the afflictive obscurations as their main objects of abandonment, and they are also similar in taking the selflessness of persons as their main object of meditation. However, there is a reason why there is a difference in the results of those two in terms of inferiority and superiority. It is because there is a difference in terms of the amount of merit accumulated and the length of time [spent accumulating that merit].

The Autonomists are similar to the Proponents of Mind Only in asserting two types of sutras - Great Vehicle sutras and Lesser Vehicle sutras - and in asserting two parts to sutras - the definitive and interpretive.

However, they are not similar in the illustrations of these because the Proponents of Mind Only assert the first two turnings of the wheel [of Dharma] to be sutras of interpretive meaning and the third to be sutras of definitive meaning. In this context, the first and third turnings of the wheel [of Dharma] are sutras of interpretive meaning, while the middle [turning of the wheel of Dharma] has both parts - interpretive and definitive - because those in which the qualification of 'ultimately' is applied to the object of negation are asserted to be sutras of definitive meaning, while those of the middle turning of the wheel, in which it is not applied, are asserted to be sutras of interpretive meaning.

Consequence School

The explanation of the Consequence School (*Skt. Prasangika*) has seven outlines, as before.

1 Definition

The definition of a Consequentialist is: a Proponent of the Middle Way who, by way of accepting just other-approved consequences, does not assert true existence even conventionally.

2 Divisions

Examples [of Consequentialists] are Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, and Shantideva.

3 Etymology

There is a reason why Acharya Buddhapalita is called a 'Consequentialist.' He is called such due to asserting that an inferential cognizer realizing a thesis is generated in the continuum of an opponent just by [stating] consequences.

4 Way of asserting objects

There are two types of objects:

1. hidden objects and
2. manifest objects.

Objects that are necessarily realized in dependence on a reason are posited as hidden objects, and objects that can be ascertained by an ordinary person through the force of experience without depending on a reason are posited as manifest objects.

Illustrations of hidden objects are, for example, the impermanence of sound and the emptiness of sound being truly existent.

Illustrations of manifest objects are, for example, a pot and a woollen cloth.

Perceptible object¹⁷ and manifest object are equivalent.

Another way of dividing objects is into:

1. conventional truths and
2. ultimate truths.

The definition of being a conventional truth is: an object that is found by a valid cognizer analyzing a conventionality and with respect to which that valid cognizer analyzing the conventionality becomes a valid cognizer analyzing a conventionality.

It is inadmissible to divide conventional truths into two – real conventional truths and unreal conventional truths – because there are no real conventional truths. This is so

¹⁷ *mngon sum* (*Skt. pratyaksa*) This can also be translated as 'direct'. For schools other than the Consequence school, this is normally translated as 'perception' or 'direct perceiver' since it refers to the cognitive subject. In the Consequence school however it primarily refers to the object of cognition and hence it is translated here as 'perceptible object'.

because if it is a conventional truth, it is necessarily not real. This is so because if it is a conventional truth, it is necessarily unreal. [i.e., a falsity]

It is admissible to divide conventional truths into two – real and unreal – relative to the perspective of a worldly consciousness because a form, relative to the perspective of a worldly consciousness, is real, while the reflection of a face in a mirror [being a face], relative to the perspective of a worldly consciousness, is unreal. If it is real relative to the perspective of a worldly consciousness, it does not necessarily exist because truly existent forms are [real with respect to a worldly consciousness but do not exist].

The definition of being an ultimate truth is: an object found by a valid cognizer analyzing the ultimate and with respect to which that valid cognizer analyzing the ultimate becomes a valid cognizer analyzing the ultimate.

The divisions [of ultimate truths] are similar to those in the context of the Proponents of Mind Only, however in this context it is asserted that true cessations are necessarily ultimate truths.

5 Way of asserting object-possessors

The mere I that is imputed in dependence on the five aggregates is asserted to be the illustration of the person.

Person is necessarily a non-associated compositional factor.

There are two types of awarenesses:

1. valid cognizers and
2. non-valid cognizers.

There are two types of valid cognizer:

1. direct valid cognizers and
2. inferential valid cognizers.

Self-cognizing direct perceivers are not asserted, and a sense consciousness in the continuum of a sentient being is necessarily a mistaken consciousness. Mental consciousnesses and yogic direct perceivers can be either mistaken or non-mistaken.

There are two types of direct valid cognizers:

1. conceptual direct valid cognizers and
2. non-conceptual direct valid cognizers.

Illustrations of conceptual direct valid cognizers are, for example, the second moment of an inferential cognizer realizing sound to be impermanent and a remembering consciousness that is a factually concordant memory of blue generated through being induced by a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue.

An illustration of a non-conceptual direct valid cognizer is, for example, a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form.

If it is a direct valid cognizer it does not necessarily have a perceptible object because if it is a yogic direct perceiver it necessarily does not have a perceptible object. This is so because perceptible object and manifest object are equivalent.

If it is a subsequent cognizer it is necessarily a direct valid cognizer.

There are four types of inferential cognizers:

1. inferential cognizers through the power of the fact,
2. inferential cognizers through renown,
3. inferential cognizers through an example, and
4. inferential cognizers through belief.

Inferential cognizer through renown and inferential cognizer through an example are included in inferential cognizer through the power of the fact.

If it is a valid cognizer, it is not necessarily non-mistaken with respect to its determined object because an inferential cognizer realizing sound to be impermanent is a consciousness that is mistaken with respect to impermanent sound.¹⁸

If it is a consciousness, it necessarily realizes its object of comprehension because the generic image of the horns of a rabbit is the object of comprehension of a conception apprehending the horns of a rabbit, and the generic image of permanent sound is the object of comprehension of a conception apprehending sound to be permanent.

6 Way of asserting selflessness

The person being empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent is asserted to be a coarse selflessness of persons and the person being empty of true existence is asserted to be the subtle selflessness of persons.

A gross object composed of partless particles and the valid cognizer apprehending it being empty of being different substances¹⁹ is posited as a coarse selflessness of phenomena and the aggregates – the basis of designation – being empty of true existence is posited as the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

The two [subtle] selflessnesses are differentiated by way of the basis of emptiness and not by way of the object of negation because the refutation of the object of negation - true existence - upon the basis of a person is the subtle selflessness of persons, and the refutation of the object of negation - true existence - upon the basis of the aggregates and so forth is the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

The two [subtle] conceptions of self are differentiated by way of the observed object and not by way of the mode of apprehension because observing the basis - the person - and apprehending it to be truly existent is posited as the subtle conception of a self of persons, and observing the basis of imputation – the aggregates and so forth - and apprehending it to be truly existent is posited as the subtle conception of a self of phenomena.

7 Presentation of the grounds and paths

This is explained in two parts:

1. objects of abandonment and
2. actual presentation of the grounds and paths.

¹⁸ JN: 'Impermanence of sound' has been changed to 'impermanent sound' (*sgra mi rtag*)

¹⁹ Since Proponents of the Middle Way refute partless particles, a gross object composed of partless particles does not exist and hence also a valid cognizer apprehending that does not exist. Thus, since both are non-existent it can be said that they are empty of being different substances.

7A Objects of abandonment

The coarse and subtle conceptions of a self together with their seeds and the attachment and so forth that arise due to the force of those [conceptions] together with their seeds are afflictive obscurations. They are posited as obscurations that mainly prevent the attainment of liberation.

The latencies of the conception of true existence and all factors of mistaken dualistic appearance that arise due to the force of those [latencies] are obscurations to knowledge. They are posited as obscurations that mainly prevent the attainment of omniscience.

7B Actual presentation of the grounds and paths

There is no difference in terms of superiority among the views that are the objects of meditation of the persons of all three vehicles because all three are similar in taking the subtle selflessness of persons and the subtle selflessness of phenomena as their main objects of meditation.

There are differences with respect to their main objects of abandonment because hearers and solitary realizers take the two conceptions of a self together with their seeds as their main objects of abandonment, whereas bodhisattvas take the latencies of those [conceptions] as their main objects of abandonment.

The suchness that is qualified by the abandonment of the two conceptions of a self together with their seeds in the continuum of a hearer or solitary realizer foe destroyer in meditative equipoise is a nirvana without remainder, whereas such a suchness in the continuum of a hearer or solitary realizer foe destroyer in post-equipoise is a nirvana with remainder.

For those of the Great Vehicle lineage who are definite in that lineage from the very beginning, the [complete] abandonment of the afflictive obscurations occurs simultaneously with the attainment of the eighth ground, and the [complete] abandonment of the obscurations to knowledge occurs simultaneously with the actualizing of the four bodies.

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